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Summary. This article aims to develop a critical approach to squatter (gecekondu) studies in
Turkey and investigates the various representations of the gecekondu people in these studies in
different periods by placing them in their social, political and economic contexts. It details
changes in the representation of the gecekondu population from the ‘rural Other’ in the 1950s
and 1960s, to the ‘disadvantaged Other’ in the 1970s and early 1980s, to the ‘urban poor
Other(s)’, the ‘undeserving rich Other(s)’ and the ‘culturally inferior Other(s) as Sub-culture’
between the mid 1980s and mid 1990s, and  nally to the ‘threatening/varoşlu Other’ in the late
1990s. It asserts that, while the approach to the gecekondu people varies from an élitist one, to
one which is sympathetic to the gecekondu people, this group, nevertheless, has been consistently
the ‘inferior Other’ for Turkish gecekondu researchers.
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1. Introduction
There have been a signi cant number of
studies on squatter (gecekondu) settlements
and their inhabitants in Turkey since the
1950s when gecekondu housing made its  rst
striking appearance on the urban scene.
Gecekondu studies established themselves as
part of Turkish social science and were
mainly conducted by sociologists, joined also
by some political scientists and urban plan-
ners/researchers. In the year 2000, at the
beginning of a new century and a new mil-
lennium, it is time for us, as social scientists,
to stand back and consider in a critical light
the gecekondu studies we have conducted.
The representation in academic studies of the
gecekondu migrant population is worth in-
vestigating, especially when approached
critically through the relationship between
the production of knowledge and power.
Foucauldian ideas of power/knowledge and
discourse help to illuminate this relationship.
Foucault (1980) recognised the key role
played by knowledge in modern power rela-
tions: discourse transmits and produces
power; it reinforces it. Thus, discourses are
embedded in the social relations of power,
maintaining asymmetrical social relations
(McNay, 1994). Foucault argued that
Knowledge cannot be produced indepen-
dently of its use (Foucault, 1980, pp. 109–
133).
while knowledge is produced by those upon
whom has been conferred the status of saying
what counts as true (Foucault, 1980, p. 131).
Of course, this does not mean that aca-
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demics are primarily and consciously en-
gaged in the production of knowledge to
legitimise the prevailing power structure.
However, each ‘mode of domination’ (so-
ciety) has its own ‘regime of truth’ in which
truth is socially produced in relation to what
is socially de ned as false, and throughout
which interests of domination prevail. Thus,
the ‘truth’ is a social construction which is
shaped in the context of the general discourse
dominating the society at the time. Conse-
quently, we cannot separate interests from
practices in studying representations.
Perlman (1976), in her empirical research
with favela residents in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, demonstrated that the construction of
social categories in theory did not necessarily
re ect reality—on the contrary, they might
distort reality and hence reproduce power
asymmetries in society.1 This makes it very
important to undertake critical analyses of
social studies, particularly when the ‘sub-
jects’ belong to disadvantaged groups.
This paper, which recognises the role of
the ‘act of naming’ in the production of
meaning in discourse, aims to develop a criti-
cal study of the representations of the
gecekondu people in academic discourse.2
The representations of the gecekondu people
in public discourse are also mentioned in so
far as the public discourse may help to de ne
the academic discourse. We consider only
the gecekondu studies undertaken by Turkish
social scientists, and omit the studies by in-
ternational scholars, since the relationship
between the researcher and the researched is
critically investigated here with regard to the
political and socio-cultural positions of the
urban middle classes (to which the
gecekondu researchers largely belong) and
the rural migrant lower classes in Turkish
society.
Developing a critical approach to studies
of the gecekondu should not be taken to
imply a denial of their contributions to Turk-
ish social science; many of these studies have
provided important empirical data which
have helped us to familiarise ourselves with
the gecekondu. However, these studies have
failed in important ways to conceptualise
gecekondu settlements, and especially their
inhabitants, in their diversity and on an equal
footing with other urban residents. This arti-
cle approaches the issue mainly from these
two perspectives. While analysing studies of
the gecekondu, the paper also aims to pro-
vide information about the gecekondu popu-
lation (and more generally about the rural
migrant population) and the changes taking
place there and in Turkish society at large.
Thus, studies of the gecekondu are examined
by contextualising them in the wider social,
political and economic realities of Turkish
society.
In the paper, four major time-periods are
identi ed in which major shifts in the repre-
sentation of the gecekondu people in the
academic discourse can be observed—
namely, the 1950s and 1960s (‘the rural
Other’); the 1970s and early 1980s (‘the
disadvantaged Other’); the mid 1980s and
mid 1990s (‘the urban poor Other(s)’ versus
‘the undeserving Other(s)’ and ‘the culturally
inferior Other(s) as sub-culture’); and the late
1990s (‘the threatening/varoşlu Other’).3 In
the following section, a broad historical out-
line is presented, linking the shifts in per-
spectives in the representation of the
gecekondu population with the wider Turkish
political/economic context and international/
global interactions.
2. Contextualising Perspective Shifts in
Studies of the Gecekondu into the Wider
Turkish Context
Starting with the establishment of the Turk-
ish Republic in 1923 and until the 1950
elections, the Republican People’s Party
ruled Turkey as the single party in the
‘democratic’ system. Its major goal was the
modernisation of society, taking the West as
the model. In this top-down, élitist social
engineering project, led by the military and
bureaucratic élites, cultural aspects were
given priority—namely, the way of life and
outward appearance of the modernising élite
was presented as the model which should be
followed by the rest of society. In particular,
Ankara, the capital of the new republic, was
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seen as the symbol of Turkish modernisation,
and as the cradle of Turkish modernism.
When people started migrating from villages
to cities in the late 1940s and began to build
their gecekondus, their presence in the city
and their makeshift houses were perceived as
highly alarming both by the state and by the
urban élites. The élitist view was to regard
the gecekondu people as a serious obstacle to
the modernisation of the cities and the pro-
motion of the modern (Western) way of life
in them.
In the 1950s, a number of signi cant
changes took place which challenged the éli-
tist approach dominating the society. Turkey
adopted a multiparty political system and the
Democrat Party, known for its liberal econ-
omic policies, came to power, thus ending
the single-party rule of the Republican Peo-
ple’s Party. Industrialisation, based on the
import of expensive foreign technology and
capital, was given priority by the govern-
ment. Turkey strengthened its economic and
political ties with the US, the hegemonic
power in the world economy. In brief, Turk-
ish society experienced structural and politi-
cal transformations in the process of its
integration into the capitalist world economy.
All this created a sense of optimism and
belief in social progress (see, for example,
Lerner, 1958).
The 1950s witnessed the rapid urbanisation
of society. Structural interventions in agricul-
ture to integrate it into the market, largely
supported by the Marshall Plan (for example,
the introduction of tractors, fertilisers, irri-
gation systems and new agricultural prod-
ucts), resulted in a large number of peasants
migrating from their villages, in search of a
new livelihood. The growing (although still
limited) industrialisation attracted many peas-
ants to the cities, and the newly developing
road system helped to facilitate their move.
Predictably, the housing stock of the cities
lagged far behind the housing needs of the
newcomers. Thus, in the late 1940s and early
1950s, the newcomers, who were mostly
young men,  rst built shanties in and around
the city at geographically undesirable sites,
preferably close to the jobs available to them.
Their shanties were called gecekondu, liter-
ally meaning ‘built in one night’. Eventually,
they were joined by their families and, in
growing numbers, by their kin and by fellow-
villagers who were encouraged to migrate to
the city because they already had contacts
there. In the process, their shanties turned
into ‘shanty towns’ surrounding the city. The
migrant population and their shanty towns
were tolerated by the government and by the
private sector as they contributed their cheap
and  exible (unorganised) labour to the in-
dustrialisation process. Also, the Democrat
Party was well aware of the voting potential
of this large number of people and, through
its populist policies, was able to gain their
political support for they were content with
the promises of title deeds, and infrastructure
and services to their settlements, made by the
leader of the political party holding of ce.
The strengthening ties with the Western
world, especially with the US, affected the
academic sphere. The dominance of modern-
isation theory in the West at the time highly
in uenced Turkish scholars who, by and
large, believed in the modernisation of the
country following the Western experience.
Elitism and the top-down nature of Turkish
modernisation, as well as the early Turkish
Republic’s emphasis on the premises of en-
lightenment and positivism, also played a
role in the attractiveness of modernisation
theory for Turkish intellectuals. Under the
in uence of this theory, Turkish scholars ex-
pected the assimilation of rural migrants into
the modern urban society (‘the rural Other’).
The optimism of the early 1950s started to
fade away during the later years of the dec-
ade, by which time it was apparent that the
Democrat Party could not meet its promises
of a wealthier and more democratic society.
As economic problems intensi ed, public
discontent manifested itself in mass demon-
strations, particularly by the university stu-
dents. This led the government to take
increasingly oppressive measures. The vio-
lent confrontations between the government
and the public ended in a military interven-
tion in May 1960.
The military coup dissolved itself in 1961
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after writing a new constitution which was
more liberal than the earlier one (i.e. the  rst
constitution of the Turkish Republic). The
granting of extensive rights to civil society
made it possible for society to organise itself
around different political ideologies. Further-
more, the liberal economy of the earlier
government was replaced by a planned econ-
omy which favoured state intervention in the
market. This brought a new economic func-
tion to the gecekondu population as con-
sumers in the domestic market when the
national private sector needed consumers in
order to survive—it had failed to compete in
the international markets. Due to the growing
role of the gecekondu population in the econ-
omy, the  rst Gecekondu Act was passed in
1966, legally recognising the presence of
gecekondus for the  rst time and presenting
measures to cope with the ‘problem’. The
solution brought by the Act was to improve
those gecekondu settlements which were
considered to be in relatively good condition
(i.e. to bring infrastructure and services to
these settlements), to demolish those which
were not and to prevent further gecekondu
formation. As a result, starting in the late
1960s, many shanty towns turned into estab-
lished low-density residential neighbour-
hoods with infrastructure and some services.
Yet the issue of legal title remained unset-
tled, continuing to make the gecekondu peo-
ple vulnerable to government action.
The civil rights movement in the West in
the 1960s, which was critical of the type of
economic progress led by the US, started
in uencing Turkish society in the late 1960s,
blowing in the winds of opposition and radi-
calism. Political groups, particularly the sup-
porters of the Marxist ideology, began to
criticise radically the Turkish system for its
class inequalities, while also questioning the
domination of the West. These groups were
sympathetic to the poor and the disadvan-
taged who were mostly the gecekondu peo-
ple.
The power of modernisation theory in
Turkish academic circles continued in this
era, yet it started to face some challenges
under the in uence of the changes in the
Western intellectual milieu. The atmosphere
of criticism and questioning in the West had
its effects among Western scholars who at-
tacked positivism in important ways and
challenged its authority in the social sci-
ences—an authority which had become in-
creasingly strong during the 1950s.
By the 1970s, the intellectual in uence of
the West, combined with more sympathetic
images of the gecekondu population under
the in uence of leftist ideology, resulted in
the gecekondu people being seen in academic
circles as disadvantaged (‘the disadvantaged
Other’). More importantly, the development
of dependency theory by Latin American
scholars—a signi cant critique of modernis-
ation theory—affected Turkish scholars who
became less eager to use the unilinear ap-
proach of modernisation theory in their ex-
planations of social change in general, and
rural–urban migration in particular.
When we consider Turkish society in the
1970s, we see that the 1960s had laid the
ground for political polarisation and con ict.
The potential for political polarisation based
on the prevailing political milieu was quickly
established during the deteriorating econ-
omic conditions of the 1970s. The oil crisis
in the Western world in 1973 hit Turkish
society hard, and economic problems in-
tensi ed. The optimism of the 1950s was
completely gone. The radical leftist groups
organised themselves in society, particularly
among the youth (universities) and the poor
(gecekondu settlements). Gecekondu people
were the hope of the leftists, and gecekondu
settlements became the sites of radical poli-
tics. Those dominated by the left came to be
known the ‘rescued regions’ (‘kurtar õ lmõ ş
bölgeler’)—terriories into which state forces
(such as the police) could not enter. Mean-
while, migration to cities continued, and
gecekondu housing started to become a com-
petitive commodity in the face of the de-
creasing availability of land for the
newcomers. In this period, we observe that
the temporary shelters of the late 1940s and
early 1950s, which had increasingly turned
into established neighbourhoods during the
1960s, were becoming pro table commodi-
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ties. The move of the upper classes out of the
city centre, accelerated by the increase in car
ownership, played an important role in the
increase in the value of the land on which the
gecekondu settlements were built. Specu-
lation took the upper hand. The making of
easy money out of gecekondu setlements was
tolerated by the governing political parties,
who probably saw it as a means of ‘bribing’
the gecekondu population in order to keep
them from political activism against the state.
The emergence of the ultra-nationalists as
a strong group against the radical leftists in
the late 1970s, and the polarisation between
the two, led to violent attacks and brought
society to political crisis. Weak coalition
governments contributed to the crisis. Fi-
nally, in September 1980, the military inter-
vened and a new period opened up in modern
Turkish history.
The military coup dissolved itself in 1983
after three years in power, having created a
more conservative constitution which restric-
ted the formation of civil society organisa-
tions, and having imprisoned many members
of radical groups. A new government was
then elected by the public. Sharing a similar
ideology with the commanders of the coup,
the new government (the Özal government)
adopted right-wing politics,  ghting against
‘communism’ and opening up Turkish so-
ciety to the Western world through liberal
economic policies. The fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989, and hence the end of the Cold
War, legitimised the neo-liberal economic
policies of the government. On the other
hand, the attempts of the government to de-
velop a fully liberal market economy shook
society deeply, increasing migration to large
cities, unemployment rates and hence social
discontent.4 The lower-level jobs in the pub-
lic sector, which once provided favourable
employment opportunities for the gecekondu
people, became very competitive. The job
opportunities in the private sector also be-
came very competitive as companies reduced
their workforce and as some small businesses
went into bankruptcy. The increasing lay-
offs in the private sector and the shrinking of
the public sector led to high unemployment
rates and acute poverty in the gecekondu
population. The widening economic gap be-
tween the rich and the poor further in-
tensi ed discontent in the economically
disadvantaged strata, particularly among
rural migrants in the city.
Interestingly, in 1984 and 1985, several
gecekondu laws passed by the Özal govern-
ment which allowed the construction of
buildings of up to four-storeys on gecekondu
land. This opened wide the doors to the
commercialisation of gecekondus, which
could be interpreted again as the govern-
ment’s ‘bribing’ those who suffered the most
from their liberal policies, thus silencing
them by giving them the hope of becoming
rich. When the tendency of the 1970s to
regard gecekondu land as a commodity was
backed up by its legal approval in the 1980s,
the ‘apartmentalisation’ of gecekondus be-
came a widespread phenomenon. Thus, the
once-owner-occupied/owner-built gecekon-
dus were being replaced by high-rise apart-
ment buildings in which the owner of the
gecekondu land owned several apartments
(‘the undeserving rich Other’). In brief,
pessimism was felt deeply by some
gecekondu people who experienced increas-
ing deprivation, while other gecekondu peo-
ple became economically better-off in a short
period of time.
The 1980s and 1990s were the years when
society realised beyond doubt that not only
could rural migrants/gecekondu people rap-
idly jump up to a higher economic stratum,
but also they could shape the city by creating
their own ways of life and sets of values,
which were surely different from those of the
modernising urban élites. Those who became
better-off through the commercialisation of
the gecekondu were leaving their gecekondus
and moving to apartments, yet they were
preserving their own culture (‘the culturally
inferior Other as sub-culture’).
Since the mid 1980s, we have witnessed
an increasing politicisation of ethnic and sec-
tarian identities in the political atmosphere of
Turkish society. The state powers, including
the government and the military, tend to play
off one identity-group against another in
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their concern to maintain power and the le-
gitimacy of their ideology in society. This
illustrates the problem of identity politics in
‘post-modern’ times. The rise of political
Islam and the ‘Kurdish problem’ in south-
eastern Turkey following the military coup
of 1980 and, above all, the state’s increasing
emphasis on its Turkish–Sunni character has
split Turkish society and resulted in
con icting, and competing, cleavages.5 Kur-
dish and Alevi people, and especially the
younger generation of migrants who grew up
in the city, feel excluded from the system,
and claim recognition and economic
bene ts—sometimes by engaging in radical
actions.6 The ‘secularists’, alarmed by the
increasing political and economic power of
‘Islamists’, emphasise their differences—
“We are progressive; they (Islamists) are
backward”—and this includes Alevis who
have been strong supporters of the modern,
secular Turkish Republic. The increasing mi-
gration from the south-east in the 1990s, to
escape terrorism, also created cleavages. The
newcomers to large cities, many of whom are
people of Kurdish origin, have not been eas-
ily accepted into the existing migrant net-
works, and they have been experiencing
social and political discrimination. As a re-
sult, they have created their own communi-
ties, usually in the most disadvantaged
locations, and have ended up with impover-
ished lives and social stigma, creating a suit-
able atmosphere for radical action and social
fragmentation.
Within this general political atmosphere,
gecekondu communities tend to be politi-
cised and radicalised. Alevi and Sunni com-
munities exist side-by-side in gecekondu
settlements; their political views and social
lives signi cantly differ and they compete
with each other to capture political power in
the local government in order to control re-
sources. The commodi cation of gecekondu
land over the years, so that the gecekondu
has become more of a commodity than a
home to the economically disadvantaged, has
played a signi cant role in this competition
among the gecekondu neighbourhoods that
are differentiated along ethnic and sectarian
lines. Local politics has become more im-
portant than ever in the lives of the
gecekondu people. Services to the neighbour-
hood, the legalisation of gecekondu land by
distributing titles and the development of a
master plan for the neighbourhood—thus
opening the way to the apartmentalisation
process and meaning high pro ts—all de-
pend, to a large extent, on which political
party wins the local elections.
In the 1980s, we witnessed not only an
emphasis on ethnic and sectarian differences,
but also on gender. Turkish women have
been increasingly emphasising their gender
identities since the 1980s, and they have
been active in bringing to public attention the
subordination of women in society and de-
manding social and institutional changes in
favour of women. Interestingly, the belief
held by the state at the time—that the
women’s movement was insigni cant and
had only a limited ability to challenge the
status quo—easily opened up a political
space for women to organise themselves.
In brief, Turkish society has experienced
signi cant economic and social changes
since the 1980s—namely, the Islamisation
policies in the 1980s and the Sunni cation of
the state; the reactions of the Alevis to this;
the emergence of radical Islam and the
state’s perceiving it as a threat to modern
secular Turkey in the 1990s; the forced mi-
gration of the Kurdish population and the
Turki cation policies of the state; together
with deteriorating economic conditions,
growing poverty, increased unemployment
and a widening gap between the rich and the
poor. All this tended to divide society into
con icting groups and to intensify the power
struggle over lebensraum and local identi-
ties—also true for other ‘globalising cities’
(Öncü and Weyland, 1997). Furthermore,
there was a discourse shift in the West from
modernism to post-modernism which started
challenging the hegemony of modernist
grand narratives. This led to the emergence
of identity politics in Turkish society (a shift
from ‘the Other’ to ‘the Others’ in the
gecekondu discourse). The same tendencies
further created the concept of ‘varoşlu’ (‘the
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threatening Other’) in the late 1990s, which
is elaborated in the section on the ‘varoşlu
Other’.
In the following sections, the representa-
tions of gecekondu people in academic stud-
ies in particular time-periods are presented.
3. Gecekondu People in the 1950s and
1960s: The Rural Other
Early gecekondu research was conducted un-
der the in uence of the structural-functional-
ist approach in general and the modernisation
approach in particular (see, for example,
ÖgÏ retmen, 1957; Yasa, 1966, 1970, 1973;
Yörükhan, 1968). By adopting modernisation
theory as a framework for investigating ru-
ral–urban migration and migrant clustering in
gecekondu settlements, early gecekondu re-
searchers implicitly used a bipolar schema,
with modern urbanites at one end and rural–
urban migrants at the other. In other words,
modern urbanites and rural migrants occu-
pied opposite poles of the modernisation
continuum. Early gecekondu researchers, un-
der the ideological in uence of this concep-
tual model, expected a unilinear
transformation of the rural migrant popu-
lation, who would become like the ‘modern
urbanites’. They had in mind an ideal image
of the city and city residents based on the
Western model.
In this unilinear model of ‘becoming ur-
ban’, there was the expectation that the
gecekondu population—namely, rural mi-
grants in the city—would be assimilated into
the modern urban population by discarding
their rural ways of life and values. And this
implied, among other things, discarding their
accents (and their mother tongue in the case
of migrants of Kurdish origin) and changing
their appearances (way of dressing, turning
into Western-dressed women and men; this
meant for men shaving their beards, if they
wore any, and for women, uncovering their
hair). In this group of gecekondu studies, the
gecekondu family was seen as being in-be-
tween the rural and the urban family types,
and their being in transition was the major
theme:
The gecekondu family, having one end in
the village and the other end in the city,
displays the characteristics of a transitional
family (Yasa, 1970, p. 10).
Since the gecekondu family has not
 nished its adaptation process and has not
yet reached the level of urban families, it
faces material and emotional problems
(Yasa, 1970, p. 14).
They cannot be considered as urban since
they have not yet adapted to the cosmo-
politan city life (Yasa, 1970, p. 15).
The gecekondu person, while on the one
hand tries to grow vegetables and trees in
his garden like in the village, on the other
hand, hopes to become a worker in a
factory in the city (Yasa, 1970, p. 15).7
These studies compared the educational lev-
els, fertility rates, crime rates, family size,
income levels and participation rates in mass
communication (reading newspapers, listen-
ing to the radio) of ‘rural’ families with those
of ‘urban’ families. They also observed the
eating habits, hygiene practices and ways of
dressing of gecekondu families to see where
exactly they stood in the continuum between
the rural and the urban.
The temporary nature of gecekondu famil-
ies was emphasised. For example, Yasa con-
cluded his article as follows:
When we talk about the ‘gecekondu fam-
ily’, we understand an ‘unhappy’ family
which emerged under the social structural
conditions of a particular period and which
is expected to disappear after a while, thus
its presence will be short-lived compared
to the long history of society (Yasa, 1970,
p. 17).
When it was realised over the years that this
assimilation would not happen either quickly
or smoothly (if, indeed, at all), the gecekondu
people were blamed for not abandoning their
rural values.
Some rural values, even though they have
completed their functions, remain as fos-
silised ruins. To pull them out is much
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more dif cult than the elements of ma-
terial culture (Yasa, 1973, p. 45).
They were further blamed for ruralising the
city:
In some gecekondu areas, those who make
their own bread, keep poultry and cows,
and grow vegetables in their gardens make
a quite large group. This way of life of
those who came from the village and the
way of thinking they brought, until they
are urbanised, ruralises cities, especially
when there are large  ows of rural people
to cities. The Anafartalar Avenue in
Ankara, where once the most prestigious
stores of the city took place, has become
dominated by rural taste (Yörükhan, 1968,
p. 11).
Thus, in this approach, gecekondu people
were those who failed to free themselves
from their rural characteristics and who con-
stituted an obstacle to the development of
modern cities and, more importantly, to the
social transformation of society into a mod-
ern one.
In this framework, the gecekondu popu-
lation was seen as a homogeneous group; the
major characteristics which differentiated
them from other city residents were their
rural way of life and rural values which were
brought from the village and preserved in the
urban context. Thus, the emphasis was
placed on the rurality, or at best on the ‘not
yet urbanised’ characteristics, of the
gecekondu population. Further, the social
scientist implicitly, or even openly, de ned
himself/herself as a modern urbanite and, by
doing so, s/he automatically put a distance
between himself/herself and the gecekondu
population which s/he studied.
This attributed to the gecekondu popu-
lation an ‘Otherness’, a distinction be-
tween ‘us’ and ‘them’, and brought out
attempts to investigate this ‘Other’ popu-
lation with the spectacles of the urban
middle classes (Tok, 1999, p. 44).
This is evident in the following quotations:
Among the gecekondu women, we see
many of those wearing stockings with vil-
lage motifs on them. Wearing sweaters on
dresses and covering hair with scarves are
common. The dominant colour is red.
They prefer bright and shining fabric. This
 ts with the village tradition (Yasa, 1970,
p. 1).
The hygienic practices of the gecekondu
families resemble in general those in the
village. The fronts of the houses are not
usually kept clean and tidy. In addition,
since they are ignorant of home econom-
ics, they need outside help (Yasa, 1970,
p. 12).
The gecekondu family has become quite
urbanised in terms of its becoming smaller
and nuclear, yet it still preserves its rural
nature in terms of its composition and its
continuing strong ties with relatives
(Yörükhan, 1968, p. 21).
Thus, the way of dressing practised by the
urban middle classes and their tastes in cloth-
ing (mild tones, matching colours, small de-
signs), as well as their family type and
composition were taken as the model with
which the gecekondu family was compared.
Interestingly, it was women more than men
who became the object of such comparison.
In addition, in the gecekondu surveys con-
ducted in this period, it was common to ask
whether they went to see plays or movies, or
attended concerts, in an attempt to measure
their level of integration: these social prac-
tices were seen as the practices of ‘modern’
and ‘cultured’ urbanites which should be em-
ulated by the ‘lower classes’. When the
gecekondu people ‘failed’ to go to movies,
plays, or concerts, this was interpreted as
‘failing’ to become a full urbanite. Women’s
using make-up, polishing nails, having their
hair short and uncovered, as well as the
family’s eating at the table instead of eating
while sitting around the table set on the  oor
(Yasa, 1973, p. 44) were further implied as
necessary aspects of being urban.
In brief, for the social scientist, while the
established urbanites signi ed ‘Us’, the
gecekondu population was the ‘rural Other’.
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The only way open to the gecekondu people
to stop being the Other was to discard their
rurality, and this meant becoming the same
as the urbanites. Only by dropping the ‘ru-
ral’, would ‘the Other’ lose its validity. It is
important to mention here that the city has
been regarded as culturally superior to the
country in the Turkish context, both in Otto-
man times and during the Turkish Republic:
The term madaniyyat—that is, civilis-
ation—in the Muslim culture derives from
madina, or city” (Karpat, 1976, p. 244).
This brings a portrayal of peasants as igno-
rant, culturally backward and lacking man-
ners. Thus, the rural ‘Other’ not only implies
an Otherness, but this Otherness also con-
tains a major asymmetry, the rural being
‘less than’ the urban.
As stated above, the gecekondu studies in
the 1950s and 1960s were, to a large extent,
under the in uence of modernisation theory
and its bipolar conceptualisation of social
change. In these studies, the gecekondu
population was situated vis-à-vis the ‘estab-
lished modern urbanites’. Yet, interestingly,
while the gecekondu population and their
way of life were investigated empirically in
many studies, the modern urban population
was de ned in ideal terms based on the
Western model; there was no empirical re-
search conducted on how the modern resi-
dents of the city actually lived. Thus, rural
migrants were compared with an idealised
image of urbanites.
Situating the gecekondu population as a
homogeneous and abstract category on the
rural-urban—modern continuum rendered in-
visible the different groups within the
gecekondu population. The diversity among
rural migrants in terms of ethnic, sectarian
and regional differences was ignored. This
tendency in the early gecekondu studies of
not acknowledging ethnic and sectarian vari-
ations might be due to the fact that, during
the early processes of establishing gecekondu
neighbourhoods , rural migrants tended to un-
deremphasise their differences in their at-
tempt to develop internal solidarity among
themselves which was necessary for their
survival in the city—for example, in the face
of a threat of demolition of their gecekondus,
or in their bargaining with local government
for services to their neighbourhoods . Sharing
common interests regarding establishing and
improving their gecekondu settlements
tended to unite, to some degree, gecekondu
residents—or at least made them not to bring
forward their ethnic and/or sectarian differ-
ences. A second and even more important
reason lying behind this neglect of the varied
groups in the early gecekondu studies may be
the inclination of researchers to regard the
gecekondu population as the ‘rural Other’
and their concern to  nd ways to assimilate it
into the urban population. Thus, in the ma-
jority of gecekondu studies of the time, the
gecekondu population was studied by con-
structing an abstract category of the
‘gecekondu person/family’ which was differ-
ent from the ‘urban person/family’, using it
for the whole gecekondu population without
paying attention to internal variations.
4. Gecekondu People in the 1970s and
Early 1980s: The Disadvantaged Other
While this unilinear model of the modernis-
ation approach adopted in early gecekondu
research continued to be used by some schol-
ars, its hegemony in general began to be
challenged in the 1970s.8 Although the major
question was still the ‘integration’ of the
rural migrant population into urban society,
the simple dichotomy of the rural and the
urban was no longer extensively used to
study gecekondus. There were some ap-
proaches which investigated the gecekondu
phenomenon in the context of the broader
social, economic and historical forces
(Karpat, 1976; Şenyap õ l õ , 1982). For exam-
ple, Şenyap õ l õ (1982) noted the gecekondu
population’s changing position in the city as
the result of their increasing role in the econ-
omy, in both the production and consumption
spheres. Once marginal, they had become an
indispensable component of the economy,
and this was re ected in the physical appear-
ances of gecekondus, the shanties being re-
placed by relatively well-built single- or
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double-storey houses. She concluded that,
despite their integration into the economy—
albeit in an asymmetrical way—the
gecekondu people were not culturally inte-
grated within urban society due to the exclu-
sionary attitudes and practices of the
established urbanites.
The representation of the gecekondu peo-
ple as the ‘rural Other’ and culturally inferior
to the urban population did not completely
disappear from the discourse during this pe-
riod: TürkdogÏ an (1977) for example, de ned
the gecekondu culture as the ‘culture of pov-
erty’, stigmatising it as ‘fatalistic’, ‘ir-
rational’, ‘backward’, and the like. However,
several studies did stress the disadvantaged
positions of rural migrants in their inte-
gration (for example, Kongar, 1973;
Şenyap õ l õ , 1978, 1982; Sencer, 1979; Eke,
1981). They asserted that structural barriers
were preventing the integration of the mi-
grant population within the city—barriers
such as the types of job available to them
(Şenyap õ l õ , 1982, p. 246) and the inadequate
public policies in place to meet migrants’
needs (Eke, 1981, p. 67). They claimed that,
since rural migrants could not adequately
take advantage of urban facilities and ser-
vices, they were bound to remain ‘uninte-
grated’. This approach is much more
sympathetic to the rural migrant population
and tends to hold the state responsible for the
‘peasantisation of the city’. For example, Eke
(1981) and Kongar (1973) say
Higher levels of absorption are harder to
attain. This is not the fault of the migrants,
but of the lack of public policies designed
to assist them. … [The migrants] partici-
pate in the urban functions of the city
when opportunities are offered to
them. … The migrants use educational and
medical services extensively—when they
are available. Their use is not inhibited by
inherent ‘culture of poverty’ characteris-
tics but only by badly formulated policies
(Eke, 1981, p. 67).
They are open to using the opportunities in
the city, and they do not want to be treated
as second-class citizens (Kongar, 1973,
p. 70).
Furthermore, in this period, the gecekondu
phenomenon was largely seen as produced
by the type of industrialisation that ‘under-
developed countries’ were going through—
namely, ‘fast depeasantisation and slow
workerisation’ (K õ ray, 1970)—and by the
logic of the system which required the ex-
ploitation of the labour provided by the
gecekondu population. Hence the gecekondu
population was neither temporary nor mar-
ginal. Clearly, it was wrong to call
gecekondu people marginal when they made
up more than half of the urban population
(Kongar, 1973). Here we see a shift in the
academic discourse from structural–func-
tionalist–modernist explanation to structural–
Marxist explanation. Under the in uence of
dependency theory, there were also objec-
tions raised to the use of such terms as
‘unhealthy’ and ‘distorted’ urbanisation, and
also ‘Third World’ urbanisation, since that
implied a comparison with the Western ex-
perience. It was felt that it was misleading
and ideological to judge the gecekondu
phenomenon by the development models of
the West (Kongar, 1973). Moreover, past
research was criticised particularly for its
preoccupation with the ‘transformers’, ne-
glecting how the ‘ordinary people’ lived the
modernisation process (Karpat, 1976). Some
scholars further acknowledged the emerg-
ence of a new type of city, containing the
characteristics of both Western cities and the
Turkish countryside—that is, a type of city
embodies some of the technological and
industrial features of Western cities and
also the cultural and communal spirit of
the countryside (Karpat, 1976, p. 41).
Such analysis tended to play down the nega-
tive attitude of the modernisation approach to
the persistence of rural values and communal
existence in the city.
Despite these ‘positive’ changes to the
ways in which the gecekondu population was
being studied, the distance between rural mi-
grants and researchers remained unbridged in
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this period. Questions about going to the
cinema, plays, concerts and exhibitions were
still present in some studies and, in spite of
the acknowledgement of the role of structural
factors in the ‘integration/absorption’ of mi-
grants, cultural differences were also
identi ed as reasons for their ‘segregation’
(see, for example, Şenyapõ l õ , 1982, p. 246).
Closed-ended survey questions were used ex-
tensively in an attempt to quantify the data
and generalise the  ndings so that ‘the
gecekondu problem’ could be structurally
solved. There was no attempt to focus on the
experiences of rural migrants or to present
migrants as individuals who were entitled to
their own ways of thinking and living.
5. Gecekondu People in the Mid 1980s and
Mid 1990s: The Other(s)
In some of the post-1980 gecekondu studies,
we observe a tendency to replace the ‘Other’
of the early gecekondu studies by the ‘Oth-
ers’, thus recognising variations in the
gecekondu population. These variations were
sometimes explained in terms of the number
of years migrants had spent in the city (see,
for example, Alpar and Yener, 1991); other
studies took into account the ethnic, sectarian
and regional diversity of the gecekondu
population (see, for example, Güneş-Ayata,
1990/91; Erder, 1997). In these studies, the
gecekondu people were no longer exclusively
seen as a homogeneous group based on their
common rural origins. Instead, they were
seen as comprised of diverse sub-groups
based on their different ethnic and sectarian
backgrounds. As we have seen in section 2,
the emergence of identity politics in Turkish
society in the mid 1980s was one of the
major reasons for this change of approach.
In addition, further gecekondu sub-groups
emerged in the studies made during this pe-
riod. For example, gecekondu communities
became increasingly economically strati ed.
There were those who owned additional
gecekondus which they rented out, and those
who rented these gecekondus (usually young
families with very limited incomes). There
were those who improved their socioeco-
nomic positions—for example, by selling
their gecekondu land to building contractors
in return for several apartments in the build-
ing (and additionally for a store in some
cases), or by taking advantage of their net-
works in their clientelist relations. Further-
more, over the years, the children of
 rst-generation migrants became more nu-
merous; they were socialised in the city and
they had their differences from their parents.
As we have mentioned earlier, the empha-
sis on the heterogeneity of the gecekondu
population rather than on a homogeneity
based on its common rural origins was also a
result of challenges made to the universalis-
tic claims of grand theories in the West.
Today, in the academic world, increasing
attention is paid to diversity and difference
rather than to similarity and uniformity.
Amongst other things there is a greater
awareness of gender. In the early gecekondu
studies, surveys were almost always conduc-
ted with the ‘heads of the family’, who were
almost always men—thus the lives of the
gecekondu women were rendered invisible.
In the 1980s, and increasingly in the 1990s,
the gecekondu and rural migrant women,
along with other groups of women, have
appeared in academic studies (see, for exam-
ple, IÇ lkkaracan and IÇ lkkaracan, 1998; Erman,
1997, 1998a; Bolak, 1997).
While the diversity in the gecekondu
population was acknowledged in this period,
some scholars attempted to identify shared
characteristics that made the gecekondu
population distinct from the rest of urban
society. In this context, we can identify two
leading approaches: one considers the econ-
omic positions of the gecekondu population;
the other regards the gecekondu as a sub-cul-
ture. The following sub-sections elaborate on
these approaches.
5.1 The Urban Poor Other(s) versus the Un-
deserving Rich Other(s)
In this approach in the post-1980s, while ‘the
Other’ was replaced by ‘the Others’, ‘the
rural’ was replaced by the ‘urban poor’
(Erder, 1995). The presence of second- and
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third-generation migrants in the city chal-
lenged the de nition of the gecekondu people
as rural. Although ‘rurality’ was still at-
tributed to the gecekondu population in gen-
eral, ‘being rural’ was not seen any more as
a valid de ning characteristic of the
gecekondu population. Instead, ‘the new ur-
banites’ and the ‘urban poor’ began to be
used to refer to the gecekondu population.
The growing poverty in gecekondu districts
since the 1980s (World Bank, 1999) has
contributed to the emphasis on poverty in the
de nition of the gecekondu population. How-
ever, there has been relatively little research
into gecekondu poverty and, in general, there
has been a decline in the number of
gecekondu studies conducted in this period
compared with the period of the 1950s–
1970s.
In one of the few poverty studies, Erder
(1995) explained the poverty of some groups
in the gecekondu population in terms of their
exclusion from the migrant networks built on
common origin. Her empirical research
showed that the once-unconditionally-sup -
portive migrant networks had become more
selective in the 1980s in the increasingly
competitive atmosphere of the city. Thus,
those migrants (and interestingly, sometimes
urbanites) who were thought to contribute to
the political and economic power of the net-
work were included, while those who would
‘harm’ the network were excluded. The latter
were mostly the newcomers (usually Kurdish
in origin who migrated in crowded families
with many children), unskilled workers, the
disabled (including those who were disabled
in accidents at the workplace), widows, eld-
erly people and families who had experi-
enced failures in their economic lives and
those whose adult male children were unwill-
ing to work (for example, alcoholics) and
hence were burdens on their families.
In the same study, social mobility within
the gecekondu population was also investi-
gated, revealing the presence of those who
improved their economic status through their
social networks and gecekondus. Thus, the
research showed that, while acute poverty
was escalating in the gecekondu population,
some gecekondu people were becoming bet-
ter-off.
In parallel with this trend in the academic
discourse, the major theme in the public dis-
course has been that of ‘the undeserving
rich’. The emergence of a new group of
gecekondu people who became wealthy in a
short period of time led to complaints by the
established urban residents who said “Once
they built their gecekondus in one night, and
now they are becoming millionaries in one
day”. The media, including articles written
by the professional élite in newspapers, fu-
elled this reaction by portraying the
gecekondu as a means to secure unfair and
unlawful gains and as being under the control
of the ma a (see, for example, Ekinci, 1993).
The ideology of the time (the Özal period)
which valued wealth and individual ambition
above education, and also the changes in the
gecekondu laws in the 1980s, which encour-
aged pro t-making from gecekondu housing
by giving permission for multi-storey hous-
ing in gecekondu settlements, were largely
blamed for the abuse of the system by the
gecekondu people.
In brief, while a more sympathetic view of
the gecekondu people as the urban poor, the
victims of the competitive urban environ-
ment, prevailed in the academic discourse
(which also presented information on the
routes of social mobility that became avail-
able to gecekondu residents in the 1980s); in
the public discourse ‘the undeserving rich
Other’ dominated, re ecting the hostile reac-
tions of established urban society.
This focus on economic resources (or
rather, the lack of them) in gecekondu famil-
ies was characteristic of one of the two main
academic approaches of the post-1980 pe-
riod. The second approach focused on the
cultural aspect and de ned the gecekondu
population as a ‘sub-culture’. In the follow-
ing sub-section, this approach is examined in
more detail.
5.2 The Culturally Inferior Other(s) as Sub-
culture
In this approach, the gecekondu population
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was de ned as a sub-culture, distinguished
by its combination of both rural and urban
characteristics. Unlike some of the earlier
studies which emphasised the differences be-
tween the migrant and urban populations in
terms of culture expressed in highly negative
terms, the ‘sub-culture’ approach of the
1980s and early 1990s had a relatively posi-
tive, yet highly asymmetrical, view of the
‘gecekondu sub-culture’. This approach has
its roots in an earlier conceptualisation of the
gecekondu community as a ‘buffer mechan-
ism’ (Kõ ray, 1968), which was later seen as a
means of integration into the city (Tatl õ dil,
1989). The more positive gecekondu sub-
culture approach  rst appeared in the
early 1990s in the edited volume entitled
Gecekondularda Aileleraras õ Geleneksel
Dayan õ şman õ n ÇagÏ daş Organizasyonlara
Dönüşümü [The Transformation of the Inter-
familial Traditional Solidarity in Squatter
Settlements to Modern Organisations]
(Gökçe, 1993) which was based on extensive
empirical research. The introduction to the
book states that
When we have reached the 1990s, the
development of gecekondu housing has
reached the potential to in uence directly
the social, political and economic struc-
tures of society through its speci c culture
and structure, and through its social, politi-
cal and economic relations (Gökçe, 1993,
p. 3).
Here the emphasis was both quantitative (the
number of gecekondus and the people living
in them) and qualitative (the “new and orig-
inal gecekondu culture”) (Gökçe, 1993, p. 4).
The gecekondu people were shown to be
oriented towards the city (having no desire to
return to the village), to be willing to inte-
grate into the city, yet having speci c charac-
teristics that differed from those of the
established city population. These distinctive
characteristics fell into three main groups:
stronger ties with the village when compared
with the established urbanites; membership
of the lower classes in the city (low-income,
low-skilled jobs, low educational levels, in-
formal housing); and, lastly, the communities
that they formed in the city and their com-
munity-centred lives. All these (their rural
origins, their economic positions in the job
market, and their clustering) created a sub-
culture in the city. According to this ap-
proach, this sub-culture need not necessarily
be seen as failing to ‘modernise’, since
even in Western societies where individu-
alism prevails, there exists a willingness to
engage in support mechanisms based on
face-to-face, informal relations (Gökçe,
1993, p. 359).
However, despite this, de ning the
gecekondu population as a ‘sub-culture’ itself
implies inferiority, particularly if viewed
from a modernisation perspective: sub-cul-
ture is ‘less than’ the dominant culture
(which is the urban modern culture). The
gecekondu population has been said to “have
been caught between the rural and the urban”
(Gökçe, 1993, p. 1). Thus, the asymmetry
between the dominant urban culture and the
sub-culture of the gecekondu population per-
sists. The distance between the researcher
and the gecekondu population remains un-
bridged; it may even have widened.
These dual academic emphases on the
poverty and sub-culture of the gecekondu
population prepared a suitable foundation for
what was to follow—the highly negative
construction of this population as the
varoşlu, the ‘threatening Other’. The next
section elaborates on this.
6. Gecekondu People in the Late 1990s:
The Varoşlu/Threatening Other
The terms varoş and the varoşlu (the people
residing in the varoş) have been quite domi-
nant both in academic and in public dis-
course since the late 1990s. This has led to
lively discussions in scholarly meetings and
conferences regarding their usefulness and
correctness. While some academics have
adopted the term without much critical
re ection (for example, Ayata, 1996), others
have been more cautious using these terms,
questioning their social and political implica-
tions (for example, Etöz, 2000).9 In the fol-
TAHIRE ERMAN996
lowing section, the terms varoş and varoşlu
are elaborated upon as they have appeared in
the media—since the public discourse on the
varoş and varoşlu has been largely shaped by
the media and since it has been the sudden
emergence of the ‘varoş’,  rst in the media,
and then in society as a whole, that has
greatly in uenced the academic discourse.
The term varoş is Hungarian in origin and
was  rst used to denote to the neighbourhood
outside the city walls. It was later employed
to refer to any outer neighbourhood in a city
or town. In its Turkish use, the term carries
in itself strong negative connotations. The
varoşlu are the economically deprived (the
deprivation may be relative or absolute) and
impoverished lower classes who tend to en-
gage in criminal activities and radical politi-
cal actions directed against the state. They
are the political Islamists, the nationalist
Kurds, the radical leftist Alevis who chal-
lenge the political authority of the state and
disturb the social order of society. They are
also the unemployed, the street gangs, the
ma a, the tinerci (those addicted to the easily
available chemical substance used to dilute
paints) who are mostly street children and, in
a nutshell, the underclass.10 Their tendency is
towards destruction and violence, towards
crime and chaos. The media, in their search
for sensational events, bring forward those
cases where gecekondu people, especially the
youth and children, have contravened the
law, or have protested against the political
system. The 1 May demonstrations in 1996,
during which radical leftist groups were en-
gaged in vandalism, destroying buildings and
cars (their attacks on ATMs were the particu-
lar focus of the media), and the Gazi episode
of 1995, in which an uprising in an Alevi
gecekondu neighbourhood in Istanbul was
put down by the police force, as well as the
news coverage of street gangs, including the
case of the rape of a young teacher by a
group of tinerci youngsters, have all helped
to reinforce the negative image attributed to
the varoşlu. Interestingly, the  rst media use
of the term varoşlu was following the 1 May
demonstrations, after which the term began
to be widely used in society.
In brief, the varoşlu are de ned in terms of
both the economic dimension (the poor) and
the social-political dimension (the rebellious,
the outlaw, the mis t). The gecekondu peo-
ple are not only seen as an obstacle to Turk-
ish modernisation as in earlier periods, but
are also seen as a threat to the very existence
of the Republic itself. In this construction of
the varoş as the residential quarters that exist
‘outside the city walls’ where poverty rules,
illegal activities dominate and crime and vi-
olence grow, the varoş emerges as contra the
city (Etöz, 1999).11 The varoş is oppositional
to the city and is setting itself against the
city; it is hostile and antagonistic to the city.
The city is besieged by the varoşlu. This is a
very different view from that of the
gecekondu as part of an evolutionary process
leading towards assimilation as they evolve
from the rural end of the rural–urban contin-
uum towards the urban. The gecekondu/mi-
grant population is not constructed any more
as a rural population that failed to become
urban, but as a population that is attacking
the city, its values, its political institutions
and, more importantly, the very core of its
ideology (a secular and democratic society
built on consensus and unity) and its social
order. They were once kept ‘outside the city
walls’, but they are now inside: inside the
city, inside its institutions, inside its political
system—and yet they are against these val-
ues, trying to destroy them (‘inside yet
against’).
In addition to this construction of the
varoşlu as a danger to the political system,
there is a complementary construction which
emphasises the danger of the varoşlu to the
‘culture’ of society. The varoşlu are not only
those who cannot consume because of their
poverty, but they are also those who are
‘made by easy money’ yet whose lack of
education, manners and ‘emotional training’
prevents them from participation in ‘con-
sumption aesthetics’ (Etöz, 2000). They are
the ones who lack manners, taste and cultural
re nement. The inferiority of the culture of
the ‘Other’ (the ‘varoş culture’) comes to the
fore once again when some members of the
‘Other’  nd their way to wealth and oc-
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casionally to public visibility and fame (for
example, in the case of the singers who call
themselves ‘the children of varoş’). In brief,
the concept of political threat when com-
bined with the concept of cultural inferiority
completes the picture of the varoşlu at its
most negative.
How can we explain this increasingly
negative perception of the gecekondu popu-
lation during the 1990s—a period when
globalisation processes (economic, political,
socio-cultural) have escalated? It is
signi cant that, while the gecekondu settle-
ments are stigmatised as the varoş, threaten-
ing the city with their radically different
political views, con icting social values and
inferior culture (or ‘lack of culture’) and
confronting it with vandalism and violence,
the upper classes, who are now in the process
of integrating into the global economy, in
their search for ‘unpolluted lives’, are mov-
ing out of the city to suburbs.12 By building
walls (both physical and symbolic) around
their housing estates, they aim to exclude
‘the Others’.13 ‘We’ are not inside the city,
surrounded by the ‘city walls’, any more,
leaving the ‘Others’ outside. The ‘We’ and
the ‘Others’ are inside each other, the upper
classes living in ‘islands’ surrounded by
gecekondu settlements, and the rural mi-
grants ending up living ‘inside the city’ as
the result of the city’s expansion towards its
periphery and the resulting transformation of
gecekondu settlements into lower-quality
apartment housing. By stigmatising people of
rural origin as the ‘threatening Other’, as the
‘dangerous and violent Other’ and as the
illegal occupiers and holders by force not
only of some city space (that is, the
gecekondu land), but today also of the social,
cultural and political space, the upper classes
both legitimise and support politically the
objective of gecekondu demolition while re-
leasing themselves from any responsibility
for the deteriorating situation of the
gecekondu population (Etöz 1999). Behind
the labelling of the gecekondu population as
the varoşlu lies the class dimension, which
has largely disappeared from discussions in
academic circles as a result of the focus on
the variety of the gecekondu population in
terms of ethnic, sectarian and regional differ-
ences, as well as of the focus on the social
mobility of the gecekondu population, usu-
ally by utilising hemşehri (fellow-villagers)
networks. These emphasise common origins
and have blurred the class basis of social
strati cation.
In brief, by emphasising the threats posed
by the varoş to the modern Turkish Repub-
lic—corrupting the political system, chal-
lenging the core values upon which the state
is built and which hold the society together
(such as secularism and nationalism) and
creating  aws in its ‘modern culture’—and
then by labelling the gecekondu people as the
varoşlu, the economically advantaged deny
the mutuality between the poor and the
wealthy. Furthermore, the internal diversity
of the gecekondu population, which has been
increasingly recognised since the 1980s, is
once again being suppressed by use of the
term ‘varoşlu’. Once, the gecekondu popu-
lation was de ned as a homogeneous group
of rural migrants; now their heterogeneity is
being acknowledged, and yet, at the same
time, a new category is in use which tends to
homogenise in negative terms this emerging
diversity under the umbrella term of the
‘varoşlu’. The ‘varoşlu’ lumps together the
gecekondu population in terms of their
‘shared’ characteristics of ‘violence’, ‘social
disorder’, ‘political radicalism’, ‘social
con ict’ and ‘cultural inferiority’.
7. Gecekondu People in the 2000s: Their
Future Representations and Emerging
Trends in Gecekondu Studies
In the recent literature on Third World cities,
poverty, work, gender roles and the environ-
ment have been de ned as “the four key
elements of urban life” (Gilbert, 1994,
p. 605). In the 1980s and 1990s, the effects
of economic restructuring in the capitalist
world on Third World societies which have
been forced to adapt to structural adjustment,
and particularly on their metropolitan cities
which contain the majority of the workforce,
have been an important part of the research
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agenda. In this context, poverty, the changing
employment structure in the city (including
privatisation,  exible production and labour
casualisation), gender roles (as the result of
women’s increasing participation in the
workforce, especially in the informal sector)
and, to a lesser degree, the urban environ-
ment, have all been major topics emerging in
the literature.14 This is in line with trends in
gecekondu research in Turkey. Thus, we can
say that poverty and the informal sector (in-
cluding household survival strategies), as
well as political con ict and political strug-
gles and the question of identity (which are
overlooked by Gilbert, 1994) are likely to
dominate gecekondu studies in the near fu-
ture. The gecekondu people will most proba-
bly continue to be called either the ‘urban
poor’, which implies some neutrality in terms
of their cultural or social positions in society,
or the varoşlu which implies negativity, em-
phasising violence and con ict in this popu-
lation. We can further say that the ethnic,
sectarian and gender identities of the
gecekondu population will be emphasised.
Here it is important to mention a trend in
gecekondu studies which began to emerge in
the late 1990s. This is built upon very differ-
ent premises from those found in mainstream
gecekondu research. It argues for investigat-
ing the experiences of gecekondu people
from their own perspectives. By acknowl-
edging the importance of understanding
gecekondu people’s own experiences, it at-
tempts to go beyond their Otherness (see, for
example, Erman, 1997, 1998a, 1998b). This
approach, which portrays the gecekondu peo-
ple as individuals who are entitled to voice
their own experiences, is competing for
recognition in the academic domain.
8. Conclusion
This paper demonstrates the importance of
studying examples of the academic discourse
in their context, and also the relationship
between academic research and society as a
whole. Academics are members of society
who undergo an educational process which
gives them certain ways of looking at social
phenomena and certain ways of investigating
them. They occupy particular social and pol-
itical positions in society and they enjoy the
status of producing knowledge for which
they are paid. Having acknowledged this, it
becomes necessary to approach academic
studies critically, not taking for granted what
they say as representing the truth. It is crucial
to analyse them by placing them in their
political, social and economic contexts, tak-
ing into consideration international/global
in uences. International in uences on aca-
demic studies are very important in our
‘globalising’ era: societies are affecting one
another more than ever through the internet
and through international academic organisa-
tions and conferences. In particular, the West
and its discourses are penetrating more ex-
tensively into the ‘Rest’.
When we consider the evolution of
gecekondu research in Turkey from this per-
spective, we can make several points. First,
academic approaches to the study of the
gecekondu people are in uenced by the his-
torical period in which they occur. At times,
the discourse has resonated with élitist tones
in its representation of rural migrants (as in
the case of ‘the rural Other’); at times, it has
been more sympathetic (as in the case of ‘the
disadvantaged Other’). Following from this,
we can say that academics, in their pro-
duction of knowledge and contrary to what
orthodox Marxists would expect, do not at all
times serve the interests of the status quo.
However, as members of the élite and of the
middle and upper classes, they are not free
from the in uences of their social and politi-
cal positions in society. This leads on to a
third point. In line with Foucauldian ideas
about how the ‘subject’ is ‘produced’ in
modern times through institutions and prac-
tices, academics have internalised a particu-
lar way of seeing the gecekondu
people—namely, seeing them as the ‘Other’
who is ‘less than’ and ‘inferior to’ them. The
gecekondu people have always been the
‘Other’ for Turkish social scientists (with
very few exceptions), even those more sym-
pathetic researchers who viewed the
gecekondu population as being the disadvan-
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taged social group, exploited and oppressed
by society at large. This is particularly true
when speaking of gecekondu ‘culture’. The
cultural inferiority of rural migrants/the
gecekondu people is a continuing theme in
gecekondu research, ranging from the ‘rural
Other’ in the early studies to the ‘varoşlu
Other’ in recent studies. The élitist nature of
Turkish modernisation and the view created
by the modernising state that the ‘common
people’ are ignorant, uncultured and back-
ward, needing to be educated, ‘enlightened’
and trained/disciplined, as well as the role
and prestige given to the academic élite in
this process, have been internalised by many
Turkish gecekondu researchers who, by and
large, de ne themselves as responsible for
the ‘progress’ of society. Their professional
positions in the Turkish context as the cred-
ible sources of knowledge, as those who
have received education to reveal ‘social
truth’ and to guide society, legitimise further
their sense of superiority in their relationship
with the gecekondu people.
In addition to the gecekondu people’s be-
ing the ‘culturally inferior Other’, another
theme emerges in the academic research—
namely, that of the ‘undesirable Other’.
Whether they are presented as ‘the villagers
in the city’, emphasising their rurality—and
hence their being an obstacle to modernis-
ation—or as ‘the varoşlu, emphasising their
violence and political radicalism—and hence
their being a threat to the political system—
the gecekondu population has, to a large
extent, been seen as the ‘undesirable Other’.
The construction of the gecekondu people as
the ‘culturally inferior Other’ or the ‘undesir-
able Other’ helps to serve the vested interests
of the prevailing power structure in a number
of ways. The political rule and cultural supe-
riority of the modernising élite can be legit-
imised when rural migrants are constructed
in the academic and public discourse as cul-
turally inferior, socially backward (underor-
ganised or disorganised), politically
dangerous and individually ‘de cient’ (ir-
rational, fatalistic). Thus their economic con-
tributions as a source of cheap and  exible
(unorganised) labour and as consumers in the
domestic market, and their concerns for inte-
gration into urban society when they are
denied other means of integration, can re-
main unrecognised and unappreciated (and
underpaid). On the other hand, Turkish social
scientists, working in the political context of
the 1960s and 1970s,  rst drew our attention
to the exploitation and exclusion of rural
migrants in the city. Thus, it is necessary to
acknowledge here, as Foucault says, the rela-
tionship between power and the production
of knowledge without underplaying the rela-
tive autonomy of the academic discourse from
the status quo. It seems bene cial to ‘read’
critically the social categories and concepts
used in a piece of academic work by contextu-
alising it in the political and social atmosphere
and material conditions of the time.
It is crucial to complement this critical
analysis, made in the context of Turkish in-
ternal migration/gecekondu studies, with
similar analyses in other Third World coun-
tries. In this way, we can  nd out those
aspects that are particular to Turkish society
as well as the similarities shared by other
societies. Moreover, we need critical ap-
proaches to studies of urbanisation and
squatter housing in Third World societies, as
employed here, since they inform us about
the ideological basis of such studies, and the
social, economic and political realities of the
societies that produce their ideological
frameworks, including the in uence of the
theories originating in the West. This paper
aims to contribute to the  eld of urban stud-
ies in the Third World by encouraging such
critical analyses. It has demonstrated that
urbanisation and squatter studies cannot be
analysed independently of the political, so-
cial and economic structures of society and
that contextualisation within society as a
whole in terms of international/global inter-
actions is essential.
Notes
1. Perlman in her book The Myth of Marginal-
ity (1976) made a critical analysis of differ-
ent perspectives in social theory in terms of
their conceptualisations of marginality. By
applying these perspectives to the case of the
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rural migrants living in the city, she
identi ed the attributes that were used in
social theory to de ne migrants as marginal.
She then tested the claims of these perspec-
tives regarding the marginality of the rural
migrants against her empirical data. In the
end, she demonstrated that these people were
not marginal but were exploited, repressed,
stigmatised and excluded by the social sys-
tem. Thus, the negative stereotyping of rural
migrants/squatters in popular and academic
discourse has helped to legitimise their ex-
clusion and subordination in society.
2. Although the term gecekondulu is used in
some studies to refer to the gecekondu popu-
lation (see, for example, TürkdogÏ an, 1977;
Alpar and Yener, 1991), we have reserva-
tions about the term due to the negative
meanings attributed to it by society in gen-
eral, and prefer to use the term ‘gecekondu
people’ instead.
3. The paper draws upon Tok and Erman
(1999), based on Tok’s MA thesis (Tok,
1999) which was supervised and sponsored
by Erman.
4. The migration in ow to Istanbul reached 63
per cent in 1990. Today, 70 per cent of the
population of Ankara, 55 per cent of the
population of Istanbul and 50 per cent of the
population of IÇ zmir live in gecekondu settle-
ments. In 1997 the gecekondu population
reached around 20 million (Gökçe, 1993).
5. The Sunni are the orthodox Islamic sect in
Turkey to which the majority of Turkish
people belong.
6. The Alevi are a liberal Islamic sect in Turkey
to which around 20 per cent of Turkish
people belong.
7. Here the masculine form is used on purpose
since the early gecekondu studies were
mainly carried out with the ‘heads of the
family’ who were almost always men.
8. For example, Kartal (1982) developed a lin-
ear model of change which predicted that the
migrant population would acquire more ur-
ban features as they spent more time in the
city.
9. This point was also made by B. Gökçe in a
discussion that took place on 22 January
1998, during the meeting of the Turkish So-
ciological Association at Ankara, Turkey.
10. A similar conceptualisation of the term ‘un-
derclass’ has taken place in the US academic
discourse. The ‘underclass’ was  rst de ned
within the framework of the deserving and
undeserving poor, which was followed by
the ‘culture of poverty’ approach, blaming
the victim. The underclass was seen as those
in “persistent and concentrated urban pov-
erty” (Katz, 1993, p. 21), and the slums,
which housed the underclass, as the locations
where the socially alien and the politically
hostile were concentrated, as “viruses infect-
ing the moral and physical health of the city
districts that surrounded them” (Katz, 1993,
p. 9). In this way, “stigmas of cultural differ-
ence, race and poverty blended” (Katz, 1993,
p. 11). Yet, in the 1990s, an increasing num-
ber of social scientists acknowledged the
useless and ideological nature of the term
and recommended that it be abandoned.
11. This is not true any more in geographical
terms since some gecekondu neighbourhoods
are now surrounded by the high-rise housing
complexes of the middle classes as a result
of the tendency of the middle classes to
move out of the central city to the periph-
eries.
12. In this context, the meaning of ‘unpolluted
lives’ is not restricted to environmental/air
pollution; it more importantly refers to cul-
tural pollution (Öncü, 1997).
13. It is interesting to note here that this spatial-
isation of difference is observed in other
contexts very different from the Turkish
one—for example, in US cities. The example
of Los Angeles is striking: Davis (1992)
talks about the “new class war … at the level
of the built environment (p. 228); “middle-
class residential colonisation” (p. 230); and
“spatial apartheid” (p. 230). This may go as
far as the building of ‘high-tech castles’ and
‘gated communities’ by the wealthy in their
concern to exclude certain groups of people,
such as Latino and Asian families.
14. In the case of the environment, this has been
not so much the result of concerns in the
Third World about the damage to the en-
vironment as a result of urbanisation, but
more the result of increasing concerns in the
West about environmental deterioration
worldwide.
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ERDER, S. (1997) Kentsel Gerilim [Urban Ten-
sion]. Ankara: UgÏ ur Mumcu Foundation Publi-
cations.
ERMAN, T. (1997) The meaning of city living for
rural migrant women and their role in mi-
gration: the case of Turkey, Women’s Studies
International Forum, 20, pp. 263–273.
ERMAN, T. (1998a) The impact of migration on
Turkish rural women: four emergent patterns,
Gender and Society, 12, pp. 146–167.
ERMAN, T. (1998b) Becoming ‘urban’ or remain-
ing ‘rural’: the views of Turkish rural-to-urban
migrants on the ‘integration’ question, Inter-
national Journal of Middle East Studies, 30,
pp. 541–561.
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gecekondu to the varoş] Paper presented to the
Sixth National Conference of the Turkish Sci-
ence Foundation, Ankara, November.
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degÏ işen çehresini anlamak [Understanding the
changing face of the gecekondu]. Paper pre-
sented to the Sixth National Conference of the
Turkish Social Science Asssociation, Ankara,
November.
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